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INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to strengthen private antitrust enforcement, the 
United Kingdom’s recent legislative proposal stands to provide a 
viable collective redress mechanism, whereas the European 
Commission’s policy recommendation remains mired in 
constraints that will undermine its very objective. 1  The 
opportune role for collective redress is a hotly contested issue in 
the global debate over the appropriate function of private action 
in antitrust enforcement.2 While collective action has been an 
underdeveloped area of the law in the United Kingdom and 
European Union jurisdictions, its recognized value as an 
effective means of compensating antitrust infringement victims 
has galvanized interest in developing avenues for collective 
redress.3 The US answer to collective redress is the class action 

1. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] sch. 8, 103–117 (U.K.); see Commission Recommendation on Common Principles 
for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States 
Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union Law, Jul. 26, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 
201) 60 [hereinafter Commission Recommendation] (providing proposed collective 
redress mechanisms in private antitrust enforcement). 
2. See Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC antitrust 
Rules, COM (2008) 165 final (April 2008) [hereinafter Commission White Paper 
2008]; See GERAINT HOWELLS, EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF 
COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION—COUNTRY REPORT 
UNITED KINGDOM (Frank Alleweldt et al. eds., 2008); See also DEP’T FOR BUS. 
INNOVATION & SKILLS, PRIVATE ACTIONS IN COMPETITION LAW: A CONSULTATION ON 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM (2012) [hereinafter DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION] (discussing the appropriate role of private action in antitrust 
enforcement and the potential benefits and disadvantages to different collective 
redress mechanisms). 
3. See Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of Antitrust Rules, 
at 4, COM (2005) 673 final (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Commission Green Paper 2005] 
(describing the enforcement of antitrust rules in the Member States as an area of “total 
underdevelopment”); JOHN SORABJI ET AL., IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 77 (Michael Napier et al. eds., 2008) (recognizing that 
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suit, which is filed by plaintiffs on behalf of a larger group of 
people seeking a legal remedy for some perceived wrong.4 The 
US-style class action, however, has been widely criticized as 
encouraging frivolous lawsuits and giving rise to an undesirable 
culture of litigation, contributing to the so-called “toxic 
cocktail.”5 To escape the perceived flaws in the US model, the 
United Kingdom and the European Commission have 
developed new regimes, which are embodied in the recently 
proposed UK Consumer Rights Act and the European 
Commission’s Recommendation on common principles for 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States.6 
These collective action regimes proposed by the United 
Kingdom and the European Commission are the subject of this 
comparative analysis.7 Part I delivers a comprehensive review of 
antitrust enforcement in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union. This Part also surveys the academic 
literature outlining the perceived advantages and shortcomings 
of the US class action model. Part II illustrates the legal conflict 

“individual citizens have almost no chance of bringing action against powerful 
companies” and “international consensus has developed that a collective action 
procedure is the most efficient and effective means of providing genuine access to 
justice”). 
4. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 1 (2000); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and 
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 
1377 (2000) (adding that class actions often represent thousands or even millions of 
claims). 
5. Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 
370, 372–73 (2010) (illustrating the resistance of the European Commission toward US-
style class actions because in Europe, “political consensus formed that the U.S. class 
action model gave rise to highly undesirable adverse effects” and that the legal culture 
“did not contain some of the ‘toxic elements’ that make up the ‘American toxic 
cocktail’”); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to 
Europe, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 179 (2009) (“Once decried as the perversity of rapacious 
Americans, class actions are now the focus of significant reform efforts in many 
European countries and even at the level of the European Union.”). 
6. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] sch. 8, 103–117 (U.K.) (introducing a variety of consumer rights related policies, 
including reformed mechanisms for collective redress); see also Commission 
Recommendation, supra note 1 (introducing recommendations on collective redress 
mechanisms for implementation in the European Member States). 
7. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] sch. 8, 103–117 (U.K.); Commission Recommendation, supra note 1 (indicating 
the legislative proposals in the United Kingdom and the European Union relevant to 
the subsequent analysis). 
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at hand by detailing the regulatory solutions to the collective 
redress question proposed by the UK government and the 
European Commission. The critical analysis of the respective 
approaches comprises Part III. In this Part, the proposed 
collective action schemes are assessed with respect to how well 
each stands to fulfill the stated objectives. This analysis will 
demonstrate that the UK Consumer Rights Act and the 
European Commission Recommendation on collective redress 
each represent notable steps forward in enhancing private 
actions in antitrust enforcement. Part III argues, however, that 
certain safeguards implemented in both jurisdictions may prove 
highly counterproductive toward achieving the intended ends. 
I. ANTITRUST REGIMES AND EXISTING COLLECTIVE ACTION 
SCHEMES IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND 
EUROPEAN UNION 
To properly evaluate the efficacy of current and proposed 
collective action mechanisms, Part I establishes the context of 
existing antitrust law, enforcement and redress in the relevant 
jurisdictions. Part I.A sets the stage by detailing the broad 
advantages and goals of a well-developed legal infrastructure for 
bringing aggregated claims in antitrust cases. Part I.B then 
illustrates the US class action model, which is a highly developed 
regime. Part I.C explores class action critiques to identify the 
model’s perceived flaws. Finally, Part I.D and I.E sketch the 
existing regimes in the United Kingdom and European Union, 
respectively, as well as the motivations for reforming collective 
action measures in these jurisdictions. 
A. Why Provide Collective Redress At All? 
Despite United Kingdom and European resistance toward 
US-style class actions, there has been a great amount of dialogue 
on the question of how to implement mechanisms for collective 
redress in private competition litigation.8 The persistence of this 

8. See Marc A. Sittenreich, Note, The Rocky Path for Private Directors General: 
Procedure, Politics, and the Uncertain Future of EU Antitrust Damages Actions, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2701, 2712 (2010) (noting that EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes 
acknowledged the Commission was “looking for ways to boost private enforcement and 
strengthen competition”); SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 62 n.100 (describing the 
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discussion suggests that the current state of private enforcement 
in the United Kingdom and Europe is lacking in some material 
way.9 The literature suggests that the following policy objectives 
and gaps in the existing system—access to justice, market 
rectification, judicial economy, deterrence, and more robust 
private enforcement—indicate that some form of collective 
redress is desirable.10 
1. Access to Justice 
First, in UK and EU jurisdictions where claimants 
traditionally must finance their own causes of action, universal 
access to justice is a substantial challenge to strengthening 
private enforcement.11 The lack of competition litigation and 
redress can be attributed to the fact that many claims are for 
individually small amounts, which are not cost-effective actions 
to bring.12 The ability to aggregate claims and bring a suit 

antipathy in Europe toward US style class action litigation culture and quoting 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes in a speech to the Commission as saying “[t]o those who 
have come all the way from Lisbon to hear the words ‘class action’, let me be clear from 
the start: there will not be any. Not in Europe, not under my watch”). 
9 . See Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, at 8, SEC (2008) 404 final (Apr. 
2008) [hereinafter Commission Staff Working Paper 2008] (“The ECJ acknowledged, 
and recently confirmed, that the right to damages is necessary to guarantee the useful 
effect of the EC competition rules.”); DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, PRIVATE 
ACTIONS IN COMPETITION LAW: A CONSULTATION ON OPTIONS FOR REFORM—
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 3 (2013) [hereinafter OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE] (noting that responses to the UK consultation on private actions confirmed 
that the existing regime is “not working”). 
10. “Research has demonstrably evidenced an ‘unmet need’ for reform for 
collective redress mechanisms in English civil procedure. Whether this is to be achieved 
by the introduction of a new collective redress mechanism or by the supplementation 
of an existing procedure, ‘something more’ is required to facilitate the litigation and 
testing of widespread grievances, in circumstances where, presently, these grievances 
are not being addressed nor compensated.” SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 97 (citing R. 
MULHERON, REFORM OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A PERSPECTIVE 
OF NEED 157–61 (2008)). 
11. Janet Walker, Our Courts and the World: Transnational Litigation and Civil 
Procedure—Complex Transnational Litigation: Who is Afraid of U.S. Style Class Actions?, 18 
SW. J. INT’L L. 509, 518, 522 (2012) (noting that access to justice is one of the objectives 
of group litigation and that, in Lord Woolf’s 1996 Report for the United Kingdom, 
access to justice was one of the “key underpinnings of any new regime of collective 
redress”); see Hodges, supra note 5, at 373. 
12. See Hodges, supra note 5, at 371; see also Tiffany Chieu, Class Actions in the 
European Union? Importing Lessons Learned from the United States’ Experience into European 
Community Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 123, 143 (2010) (“While 
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collectively allows claimants to share costs and ultimately engage 
in more litigation.13 
2. Market Rectification 
Second, the disincentive to bringing small individual claims 
is subsequently an unjust gain for the violator of antitrust law.14 
In typical scenarios where multiple consumers or small 
businesses suffered an individually small amount of loss, that 
amount in the aggregate can be quite significant.15 The “large 
illicit windfall” gained by the perpetrator would distort 
competition and disrupt the balance of a fair free market.16 In 
light of the broader market implications of non-aggregated 
claims, some form of collective redress is necessary even if the 
individual claims themselves are not overly burdensome to each 
claimant.17 

the class action device has its critics, it has been particularly useful in the United States 
among individuals with small claims who, without class action mechanisms, have no 
economic incentive to bring lawsuits on their own.”); Commission White Paper 2008, 
supra note 2, at 4 (“Individual consumers, but also small businesses, especially those 
who have suffered scattered and relatively low-value damage, are often deterred from 
bringing an individual action for damages by the costs, delays, uncertainties, risks and 
burdens involved. As a result, many of these victims currently remain 
uncompensated.”). 
13. Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, supra note 9, at 14 (reporting that 
respondents to the Commission’s 2005 Green Paper recognized “the need to allow 
consumer claims to be aggregated in some way, particularly to reduce the difference 
between the costs of action and the often small value of the damage individually 
suffered.”); see Chieu, supra note 12, at 137. 
14. See Hodges, supra note 5, at 371 (linking the gap in judicial remedies for 
antitrust violations with broader implications for the European internal market); Tiana 
Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 156 
(2010) (noting the importance of disgorgement as a public policy matter, i.e., equity 
principles provide that wrongdoers should not profit from their wrongdoing and 
“[s]ociety benefits . . . when courts devise remedies that force defendants to relinquish 
ill-gotten gains”). 
15. See Hodges, supra note 5, at 371; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private 
Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 635 
(2010) (discussing the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains by antitrust violators via treble 
damages in US antitrust cases). 
16. Hodges, supra note 5, at 371 (providing that such an illicit windfall would 
produce an imbalance in the market, which “would not conform to the ideals of fair 
competition within the European internal market”). 
17. See id. at 371 (describing broader market implications, including barriers for 
consumers to wield maximum economic power and barriers for small businesses to 
maximize innovative and regenerative potential). 
2014] COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE AND THE UK 1645 
3. Judicial Economy 
Third, a procedure allowing aggregated claims would 
provide for swifter, more effective resolution of cases that, due 
to the number of claimants and nature of the claims, are not 
conducive to individual treatment.18 The corollary objectives of 
proportionality and predictability also support the adoption of 
collective action reform; for instance, in a justice system that 
aims to allocate resources proportionately, the aggregation of 
similar claims under collective action is more efficient than a 
series of individual claims.19 Also, a class action regime would 
streamline the outcomes of related claims and increase 
predictability, whereas a succession of individual claims might 
lead to a wide range of outcomes depending on the strategies of 
each court.20 Furthermore, allowing for aggregated claims under 
a single suit improves efficiency for defendants; collective action 
mechanisms promote finality in that defendants can avoid 
duplicative litigation of the same claim.21 
4. Deterrence 
Fourth, collective redress bolsters the overarching aim of all 
antitrust enforcement: deterrence. 22  The UK Office of Fair 

18. Sir Harry Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the 
Civil Justice System in England and Wales, ch. 17 para. 2 (1996), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/
sec4c.htm; see also Chieu, supra note 12, at 150 (“The failure to include all identifiable 
victims also undermines one of the benefits of collective action: judicial economy.”). 
19. Walker, supra note 11, at 521–23; SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 51 (providing 
that “proportionality & efficiency” are a valid benchmark to be applied when 
evaluating approaches to collective action). 
20. Walker, supra note 11, at 522 (noting that in the absence of a mechanism to 
aggregate claims, a multitude of courses will produce a range of outcomes and 
decrease predictability). 
21. See Walker, supra note 11, at 523; SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 167 
(contending that aggregating damages is essential to the success of a collective action 
mechanism because it “ensures that the defendant has certainty and finality in terms of 
their liability to all claimants”); see also Woolf, supra note 18, ch. 17 para. 2 (discussing 
the importance of achieving fairness in the balance between the claimants’ and 
defendants’ rights and the interests of both parties in litigating the action “as a whole 
and in an effective manner”); Multi-party Actions, DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec4c
.htm (last visited June 10, 2014).  
22. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 633; see also Walker, supra note 11, at 523. But 
see Commission Communication, Toward a European Horizontal Framework for 
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Trading (the “OFT”) and the Commission have agreed that 
private actions are an essential complement to public 
enforcement in that expand the pool of claims to investigate 
and strengthen deterrence.” 23  Collective action further 
enhances deterrence because the threat of a suit representing 
thousands of similarly situated claimants is a daunting incentive 
for defendants to discontinue any anti-competitive behavior.24 
5. More Robust Private Enforcement 
Finally, “no antitrust regulation system has any realistic 
chance of success without [private antitrust litigation].” 25 
Collective redress mechanisms stand to contribute substantially 
to a broader effort in Europe and the United Kingdom to 
increase private antitrust enforcement.26 In the United Kingdom, 
the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales (“CJC”) reports 
that individual citizens have “almost no chance of bringing 

Collective Redress, at 7, COM (2013) 401/2, 7 [hereinafter Commission 
Communication 2013] (evidencing traditional European jurisprudence that public 
enforcement serves to prevent, detect and deter, whereas private enforcement should 
solely aim to secure compensation for victims, and acknowledging that where public 
enforcement is weak, private actions can also serve a deterrence function). 
23. Walker, supra note 11, at 523 (identifying deterrence as an “important 
ancillary consequence” of private enforcement, but simply a by-product of achieving 
compensation for class members); see also Commission White Paper 2008, supra note 2, 
at 3 (“Effective remedies for private parties also increase the likelihood that a greater 
number of illegal restrictions of competition will be detected and that the infringers 
will be held liable. Improving compensatory justice would therefore inherently also 
produce beneficial effects in terms of deterrence of future infringements and greater 
compliance with EC antitrust rules.”). 
24. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 635 (“It is one thing for a defendant to be sued by 
a single plaintiff for a single overcharge. It is quite another for a defendant to be sued 
by a plaintiff on behalf of tens of thousands of similarly situated victims of antitrust 
violations.”); Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2707. 
25. CLIFFORD A. JONES, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE EU, UK 
AND USA, at xii (1999); see SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 79 (noting that both the 
Office of Fair Trading (the “OFT”) and the European Commission have publicly 
acknowledged that private actions are a “necessary complement” to public 
enforcement efforts). 
26 . DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 52 (2013) (U.K.) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013] (noting that the reforms to 
the UK collective action regime were intended to “enhance opportunities for 
businesses and consumers to obtain compensation for losses, and to tackle anti-
competitive behavior”); Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 13 
(identifying one goal of the Commission’s proposed reforms as “facilitating effective 
private collective redress”). 
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actions against powerful companies” and recommends that the 
government actively pursue a procedural shift that favors 
individual claimants, either as consumers or small businesses.27 
Furthermore, the UK Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills expressed that the existing private action regime in 
competition law is “not working” and that most consumers and 
small businesses lack access to justice. 28  Similarly in the 
European context, the 2005 Green Paper identified the area of 
damages claims for infringements of antitrust rules as one of 
total underdevelopment, and the subsequent 2008 White Paper 
underscored the present state of ineffectiveness in private 
antitrust litigation.29 As noted by Judge Ginsburg of the US 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, “The prevailing view in 
Europe seems to be that competition policy would benefit from 
an increased level of private enforcement.”30 
B. Antitrust and Enforcement Mechanisms in the United States 
The legislation upon which all US antitrust enforcement is 
based is the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”) 
and the amending Clayton Act of 1914 (“Clayton Act”). 31 
Together these federal statutes prohibit activities that restrain 
competition in the free market and provide remedies for 
antitrust violations.32 Section 1 of the Sherman Act bars any 

27. SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 77; see DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—
2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that consumers and small businesses 
face financing difficulties in bringing competition actions, as well as liability concerns 
that far outweigh the individual value of the claim in the event that the individual cases 
lose). 
28 . OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 2013, supra note 9, at 3; 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, supra note 26, at 4–5 (describing 
existing consumer law as unsatisfactory and the aim of reforms as enabling consumers 
and businesses easier access to justice). 
29. Commission Green Paper 2005, supra note 3, at 4; Commission White Paper 
2008, supra note 2, at 2. 
30. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and 
Europe, 1 J. OF COMP. L. & ECON. 427, 435 (2005); see Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2707–
08 (noting that private litigation can provide compensation to consumers and 
businesses for economic injuries and that “the Commission intends to make damages 
actions the primary means of compensation for EU antitrust victims”). 
31. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890) (providing the basis of federal 
antitrust and anti-monopoly law in the United States); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 
(1914) (amending and supplementing the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
32. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 
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agreement that, as its aim or effect, restricts interstate trade, 
while Section 2 proscribes monopolization and conspiracy to 
monopolize.33 The Clayton Act further expands the meaning of 
anti-competitive practices beyond the traditional concept of 
monopoly to include, among others practices, price 
discrimination, exclusive dealings, and anti-competitive 
mergers.34 
The United States’ approach toward antitrust enforcement 
is twofold: public and private.35 On the public side, the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) are charged with leading 
investigations and adjudications against violators of antitrust 
laws on behalf of the federal government.36 On the private side, 
private litigation brought forward by the victims of antitrust 
infringements constitutes a substantial component of antitrust 
enforcement in the United States.37 In the event that an antitrust 
violation occurs, the Clayton Act provides standing for injured 
persons to bring actions for treble damages against the 
perpetrators of the wrongful anti-competitive conduct. 38 
Consequently, at least ninety percent of all federal antitrust 
cases up until the 1980s were private actions.39  Even more 

33. 15. U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (declaring illegal any collusive behavior in restraint of trade 
or commerce, as well as any monopolistic behavior in trade or commerce). 
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (providing that persons engaged in commerce shall 
not discriminate in price, take part in exclusive dealing arrangements, or acquire 
monopolistic power in any line of commerce). 
35. Chieu, supra note 12, at 130; see also Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2710 
(identifying public enforcement by the DOJ and FTC and private enforcement through 
damages actions as primary enforcement mechanisms). 
36. Chieu, supra note 12, at 129–30; Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2710 (outlining 
the respective antitrust enforcement responsibilities of the US Federal Trade 
Comission (“FTC”) and Department of Justice (“DOJ”)). Individual state governments 
also enforce antitrust statutes at the state level. See, e.g., N.Y. St. Office of the Att’y 
General, Antitrust Enforcement, http://www.ag.ny.gov/antitrust/antitrust-enforcement 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
37. Chieu, supra note 12, at 130; Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of 
Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 210 (2003) (“The vast majority of 
antitrust enforcement comes through private damages suits.”). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (providing that any person injured by conduct forbidden by 
US antitrust laws may sue in federal court and “shall recover threefold the damages by 
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”). 
39. Chieu, supra note 12, at 130; see also George Berrisch et al., E.U. Competition 
and Private Actions for Damages: The Symposium on European Competition Law, 24 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 585, 591 (2004) (noting that in 2002 over ninety percent of antitrust 
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recently, US Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics indicate that, in 
2013, ninety-eight percent of antitrust cases in federal courts 
were private actions.40 
The significance of the link between public and private 
enforcement cannot be overstated. Government investigation 
and prosecution of parties accused of anti-competitive conduct 
can be a valuable source of evidence for aggrieved individuals 
pursuing private litigation.41 In this capacity, lawsuits brought by 
the DOJ may act as roadmaps for subsequent private litigation 
(i.e., follow-on actions); in cases where defendants are found 
guilty of antitrust violations or where defendants choose to settle, 
the outcomes can have preclusive effect on related litigation to 
follow.42 
An element that has, in the past, distinguished US private 
antitrust enforcement from those of other countries is the 
capacity to bring a collective suit on behalf of a class.43 Class 
action suits, which may be brought under Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or under the Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005, are a powerful tool useful in compensating victims of 
antitrust violations and broadly deterring anti-competitive 
behavior.44 Proponents of class actions typically herald the cost-

proceedings were initiated by private individuals, many of whom were seeking 
damages). 
40. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases 
Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During 12-month Period Ending March 
31, 2012 and 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseload
Statistics/caseload-statistics-2013.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (reporting that 762 of 
776 antitrust cases in federal courts were private actions); see Berrisch et al., supra note 
39, at 591 (reporting that in 2002, over ninety percent of antitrust claims were initiated 
by private individuals). 
41. Weber Waller, supra note 37, at 210 (noting that plaintiffs may bring follow-on 
actions by “making any verdict in a government antitrust case prima facie evidence in 
subsequent private litigation”); Berrisch et al., supra note 39, at 598 (noting that private 
plaintiffs are “not required to re-litigate issues that have already been decided in civil or 
criminal judgments in favor of the government, including plea bargains”). 
42. Berrisch et al., supra note 39, at 598 (describing how the Clayton Act, for 
example, allows private plaintiffs to “piggyback” on government enforcement actions 
by citing final judgments as evidence against defendants as a matter of estoppel 
between the parties in follow-on private litigation). 
43. See generally Russell, supra note 14; Hodges, supra note 5 (outlining the policy 
objectives discussed in developing a model of collective redress for Europe). 
44. Chieu, supra note 12, at 137; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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saving benefits for clients and courts, as well as the ability to 
address problems involving prospective litigant apathy.45 
Furthermore, scholars argue that US-style class actions 
enhance broader antitrust goals of deterrence and 
compensation.46 Research suggests that class actions are a strong 
disincentive for wrongdoing. 47  A 2008 study analyzing this 
deterrent effect found that the criminal antitrust fines imposed 
by the DOJ during the period of the study totaled US$4.323 
billion, whereas the recoveries from private antitrust class 
actions amounted to between US$18.006 billion and US$19.639 
billion.48 Additionally, cases discovered and initiated by private 
attorneys represented at least forty-three to forty-seven percent 
of the total amount recovered from private antitrust class 
actions. 49  The active role private attorneys play in driving 
antitrust enforcement is significant because it counters the 
argument that private actions are commonly follow-on cases 
offering limited additional deterrence.50 

45. Russell, supra note 14, at 145; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: 
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 
422 (2000) (discussing low opt-out rates, Coffee explains that rational apathy exists for 
“[s]mall claimants who have only modest claims and no real alternative because their 
claims are typically too small to litigate on an individual basis [and these claimants] will 
simply not bother to opt-out”). 
46. Russell, supra note 14, at 145–48; see Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action 
Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 
1926–27 (2000) (discussing a shift in thinking on class actions from Professor Kenneth 
W. Dam’s efficiency, compensation and deterrence analysis to Professor John Coffee’s 
critique highlighting problems with the class action model). 
47. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 880 (2008) (indicating that the results 
of the study show “private litigation probably does more to deter antitrust violations 
than all the fines and incarceration imposed as a result of criminal enforcement by the 
DOJ”); see also Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2707 (“The threat of a costly lawsuit or a 
large adverse judgment can deter businesses from engaging in anticompetitive 
conduct.”). 
48. Lande & Davis, supra note 47, at 893 (demonstrating that the damages 
recovered by private litigants in antitrust class actions were significantly greater than 
the aggregate of criminal antitrust fines imposed). 
49. Lande & Davis, supra note 47, at 897 (illustrating that US$7.631 to US$8.981 
billion came from the fifteen cases that did not follow any government enforcement 
actions). 
50. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law 
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) 
(“Although the conventional wisdom has long been that class actions tend to ‘tag along’ 
on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust litigation by 
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Class actions are also often a source of compensation for 
legitimate victims of antitrust violations.51 The availability of class 
action suits allows plaintiffs whose individual claims are too 
small to justify the high costs of litigating to aggregate potential 
claims in an economically efficient way.52 Therefore, without the 
threat of class action suits, defendant corporations that violate 
antitrust regulations could be safe from litigation as long as the 
harm inflicted on individual claimants is small.53 Moreover, class 
action suits are an efficient means of victim compensation.54 A 
study of 1120 class actions filed between 1990 and 2003 found 
that for every dollar recovered, 18.4 cents were allocated to 
attorneys’ fees and expenses while 81.6 cents went directly to 
class members.55 
C. Critiques of the US Class Action Scheme 
While the US system of private antitrust enforcement is 
indisputably the world’s most developed regime, “[t]he concept 
of US-style class actions can send chills down the spines of many 
EU attorneys, conjuring images of greedy rushes to the 
courthouse.”56 US class actions have been met with substantial 

Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at ‘[l]ess than 20% of private 
antitrust actions filed between 1976 and 1983.’”). 
51. Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2711; Russell, supra note 14, at 144 (noting that a 
consensus exists in the class action literature that such suits provide compensation to 
victims of antitrust violations). 
52. Brunet, supra note 46, at 1926–27; Sittenreich, supra note 8 (“Class action 
rights enable plaintiffs to aggregate claims where it would not be practical to sue 
individually.”) 
53. Russell, supra note 14, at 148 (arguing that class actions provide an implicit 
check on corporate anticompetitive conduct). 
54. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: 
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131 (2006) (citing Attorney 
Fee Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, 24 CLASS ACTION REPS. 167 (2003)); Brunet, 
supra note 46, at 1926 (noting that the aggregation of claims in a class action suit create 
the possibility that “valid legal and factual claims could be compensated”). 
55. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 54, at 131. But see Issacharoff & Miller, supra 
note 5, at 186 (clarifying that the class action attorney inevitably recovers more than 
any single class member). Counsel typically recovers between ten to thirty percent of 
the total recovery. Therefore, the only way an individual class member could recover as 
much as counsel would be if that class member experienced between ten to thirty 
percent of the harm. Id. 
56 . Gregory P. Olsen, Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation in the EU, 20 
ANTITRUST 73, 73, 75 (2005); Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2710 (“The United States has 
the most advanced system of private antitrust litigation in the world.”). 
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skepticism in European jurisdictions and certain aspects of the 
US model are viewed as “contrary to the legal tradition of the 
E.U. Member States.”57 The Commission drafted its 2008 White 
Paper with specific intent to avoid the more undesirable aspects 
of US class action suits and former Competition Commissioner 
Neelie Kroes underscored this aim in a 2005 speech where she 
explained that the Commission intends to “foster a competition 
culture, not a litigation culture.”58 Class action criticism can be 
aligned according to two fundamental threads: (1) the principal-
agent relationship; and (2) the threat of frivolous litigation and 
over-deterrence.59 
The principal-agent critique suggests that many of the 
problems in representative actions stem from a “misalignment 
of interests” between attorneys and the represented clients, as 
class attorneys are concerned primarily with contingent fees.60 
Further asymmetry is evident between class attorneys and 
defendants, who are burdened not only by legal fees but also the 
potential for liability.61 These asymmetries become especially 
significant within the context of settlement negotiations where 

57. Berrisch et al., supra note 39, at 598 (arguing that contingency fees are likely 
unenforceable by the European Court of Justice because they are “contrary to the legal 
traditions of the E.U. Member States, and . . . are also seen in Europe as encouraging 
frivolous or meritless litigation”); Chieu, supra note 12, at 125–26 (describing 
European aversion to the US class action model, which is perceived to yield a culture of 
litigation). 
58. Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2713 (noting the aims and objectives set forth in 
the Commission’s White Paper); Neelie Kroes, Comm’r for Competition, European 
Commission Dinner Speech at the Harvard Club: Enhancing Actions for Damages for 
Breach of Competition Rules in Europe (Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-533_en.htm. 
59. Russell, supra note 14, at 148; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 54, at 155–
59 (discussing the over-deterrence critique); Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5, at 184 
(discussing the scope of agency power of class counsel). 
60. Russell, supra note 14, at 148 (recounting Professor John Coffee’s assessment 
of the principal-agent problem in which “common pool problems cause class action 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to underinvest in their work”); see Gilles & Friedman, supra note 54, 
at 113 n.35 (2006). 
61. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. 
L. J. 625, 635–36 (1987) (adding that the defendant can be expected to exploit the cost 
differential between themself and the plaintiff; by expending more resources, pursuing 
more collateral issues, and investing more readily in the action, the defendant raises 
the stakes); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 889–90 (1987) 
(using empirical evidence to suggest that the asymmetric stakes between class action 
attorneys and clients, and how this asymmetry can affect recovery outcomes). 
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“sweetheart deal settlements” enable class action attorneys to 
profit even if the class members do not.62 For class attorneys, 
financial incentives lie in fees disproportionate to the effort 
invested in the case, while for defendants’ counsel, the rewards 
lie in the ability to return to business as usual, despite the merits 
of the case.63 
For society, however, there are substantial costs: lost 
opportunities for deterrence (if class counsel settled too quickly 
and too cheaply), wasted resources (if defendants settled simply 
to get rid of the lawsuit at an attractive price, rather than 
because the case was meritorious), and—over the long run—
increasing amounts of frivolous litigation as the attraction of 
such lawsuits becomes apparent to an ever-increasing number of 
plaintiff lawyers.64 
Unfair settlements are even more likely in the class action 
system because the represented class members are unlikely to 
actively monitor the attorney’s behavior.65 As class attorneys “are 
not subject to monitoring by their putative clients, they operate 
largely according to their own self-interest, subject only to 
whatever constraints might be imposed by bar discipline, judicial 
oversight, and their own sense of ethics and fiduciary 
responsibilities.”66 Class attorneys are in effect free to make 

62 . Russell, supra note 14, at 148–49 (demonstrating the class attorney’s 
contingent fee “is not congruent with that of his client”); see also Brunet, supra note 46, 
at 1929 n.44 (referencing commentary and cases evidencing class settlements that were 
overturned on the basis of inequity, including In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 360, 364 (E.D. La. 1997), where the presiding judge rejected a 
class action settlement because it suggested collusion by overcompensating class 
attorneys while granting class members “only a safety video and an inspection”). 
63. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (“The powerful financial incentives that 
drive plaintiff attorneys to assume the risk of litigation intersect with powerful interests 
on the defense side in settling litigation as early and as cheaply as possible, with the 
least publicity . . . .”). 
64. Id. 
65. Brunet, supra note 46, at 1929 (“Potentially unfair settlements caused by 
asymmetry cannot be effectively monitored.”); see HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 9–10 
(expressing that “there are few if any consumer class members who actively monitor 
the class attorney’s behavior”). 
66. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1991); Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5, at 188 (noting that 
“surely, there is some connection between the American use of the private attorney 
general and the capacity for . . . criminal misconduct and the breach of some of the 
most solemn obligations shared by all lawyers”). 
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decisions on behalf of the clients based on self-interest rather 
than the interests of the class.67 
The principal-agent problem is further exacerbated by the 
inherent tension between “principles of finality in settlement 
and the scope of the agency power of class counsel.”68 US courts 
rely on procedural and intuitive controls to address the concern 
of unselected, unsupervised attorneys settling on behalf of 
absent class members. 69  Practitioners and scholars alike are 
skeptical that such controls can effectively mitigate the 
dominance of class action settlements struck by counsel without 
adequate representation.70 
Opponents of the class action model also contend that the 
system leads to frivolous claims and over deterrence. 71  In 
principle, US class action lawyers are entrepreneurial.72 As legal 
fees typically are calculated as a percentage of the total damages 

67. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 54, at 104 (highlighting the “significant 
possibility that litigation decisions will be made in accordance with the lawyer’s 
economic interests rather than those of the class”); Russell, supra note 14, at 149 
(positing that class action attorneys can be “rent-seeking entrepreneurs who operate 
with total freedom and who make decisions based on their own self-interest rather than 
the interests of the class”). 
68. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5, at 184; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 54, at 
113 (providing that because small claim class members have little at stake individually 
and lack both expertise and information, they consequently lack the incentive and 
capacity to monitor their agent attorneys). 
69. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5 (arguing procedural protections often are 
reduced down to process minima, first established in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797, 803 (1985), which requires individual notice, an opportunity to opt-out, and a 
guarantee of non-conflict of interests in representation. Judicial intuition lies in the 
notion that class members need not allege identical harms, but must have basically 
fungible claims); Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1379 (concluding that courts 
provide appropriate safeguards in class action lawsuits to address the concerns of 
abusive settlements struck by representative attorneys). 
70 . Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5, at 184–85 (noting that class action 
settlements seem to be dominated by class attorneys who offer to settle claims of those 
they do not represent). 
71. Russell, supra note 14, at 148. But see Gilles & Friedman, supra note 54, at 156 
(positing that over-deterrence is not a major concern because where class actions 
survive a defendant’s dispositive motions, the parties settle and generally do so for 
significantly less than the full value of the social loss created by the defendant’s 
conduct). 
72. Macey & Miller, supra note 66, at 7 (arguing that “the single most salient 
characteristic of class and derivative litigation is the existence of ‘entrepreneurial’ 
plaintiffs’ attorneys”); see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5, at 191 (identifying the role 
of private entrepreneurial lawyers as the aspect of America class action practice that 
Europeans find most troubling). 
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paid by defendants in successful claims (i.e., contingent fees), 
large class action suits with many class members stand to pay out 
very high sums. 73  The opportunity for great financial gain 
motivates attorneys to solicit clients to further aggregate claims; 
the fear is that, in doing so, class action attorneys may 
aggressively pursue frivolous, non-meritorious suits. 74 
Furthermore, attorneys can leverage class actions suits and the 
asymmetric stakes to extort settlements from defendants on non-
meritorious claims. 75  The ultimate over-deterrent effect of 
defendant payouts on illegitimate claims is that consumers pay 
for the litigation costs via increased prices for products.76 
Critics identify the sources of US class actions excesses as 
rooted in several specific features, including the opt-out 
mechanism, broad pre-trial discovery rights, contingent fee 
agreements, jury trials, absence of a loser pays rule, and treble 
damages.77 Both the UK Draft Consumer Rights Act and the 

73. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 (noting that class action specialists have 
developed monitoring strategies to detect situations that stand to offer attractive 
litigation). But see Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2736 (referencing research by Professors 
Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok suggesting that, first, attorneys who work on 
contingent fees turn down more cases and provide a comparatively better quality of 
legal counsel, and second, contingent fees encourage settlements while hourly wages 
are more likely to lead to delays). 
74. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 (suggesting that “private attorneys general 
may be too willing to bring non-meritorious suits if these suits produce generous 
financial rewards”); Russell, supra note 14, at 150–51 (positing that class action suits are 
often “vehicles for enriching plaintiff class action attorneys, not mechanisms for 
ensuring that important legal rules are enforced or for compensating consumers”). 
75. Russell, supra note 14, at 150; Brunet, supra note 46, at 1930 (referencing 
Professor Coffee’s theory that differences in stakes, expertise and risks can induce 
defendants to settle for amounts with little regard for the merits of the claim; where 
“conditions for a ‘strike suit’ are present, settlements could result that are inaccurate 
and inefficient.”). 
76. Russell, supra note 14, at 150–51 (positing that trivial lawsuits “in reality, are 
often vehicles for enriching plaintiff class action attorneys, not mechanisms for 
ensuring that important legal rules are enforced or for compensating consumers . . . 
[who] pay for this litigation through increased product costs”). 
77. Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, supra note 9, at 14, 21, 30 (discussing 
class action excesses in a variety of contexts, such as abusive settlements, claimant’s loss 
of control as agents pursue self-interest, and overly burdensome disclosure obligations 
for defendants); Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2727–28; Olsen, supra note 56, at 75. But 
see Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, supra note 9, at 17 n.24 (remarking that 
while the Commission must consider the dangers of US class action litigation, the 
Commission should also note that the European legal regimes are inherently different. 
In fact, many of the features contributing to American excesses—including jury trial, 
one-way cost shifting, treble damages, wide pre-trial discovery, contingent fees, and an 
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European Recommendation on collective redress mechanisms 
have taken explicit steps to address these allegedly undesirable 
features in order to mitigate the threat of adopting US-style class 
actions, which critics call the result of a “toxic cocktail.”78 
More broadly, the US Supreme Court recently has 
demonstrated a heightened level of skepticism toward the scope 
of private action’s role in antitrust cases. 79  In Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko and Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court articulated this 
shift in attitude and four themes emerged: a fear of false 
positives; a confidence deficit in the capacity of judges and juries 
to achieve correct results; an inability among judges to cost-
effectively manage antitrust litigation; and a broad 
predisposition for regulation over judicial intervention.80 Later 
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court held that a 
“rigorous analysis” must apply in evaluating the Rule 23 
prerequisites, which are (a) numerosity, showing that 
aggregating the claims is more practical than individual 
litigation, (b) commonality among claims, with respect to factual 

opt-out model—are absent in European jurisdictions. Therefore, the introduction of a 
collective redress mechanism within the European legal context may not produce the 
effects seen in the US model). 
78. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 640 (noting that “it is readily apparent that the 
American model for private antitrust enforcement is viewed with considerable 
skepticism abroad” and that the US system has been dubbed a “toxic cocktail”); see e.g., 
Press Release, European Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – 
Questions and Answers (Nov. 27, 2008) (identifying the elements of the “toxic cocktail” 
as contingency fees, punitive damages, pre-trial discovery, and opt-out systems; 
recommending that the European Commission should not adopt these features of the 
US model). 
79. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 636 (arguing that despite historical support for 
the broad remedial effects of the private action in antitrust cases, “the Supreme 
Court . . . now clearly views the private action with skepticism”); Lee Goldman, Trouble 
for Private Enforcement of the Act: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Oligopoly Problem, 2008 
BYU L. REV. 1057, 1069 (2008) (referencing Twombly and Trinko to demonstrate how 
the US Supreme Court has acknowledged the effect of false positives to “chill the very 
conduct [active competition] the antitrust laws are designed to protect”). 
80. Cavanaugh supra note 15, at 636; see Verizon Comms. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
399 (2004) (holding that regulation significantly reduces the likelihood of major 
antitrust harm, whereas the costs of judicial intervention must be assessed in light of its 
“slight benefits”); see Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007) (providing that 
one practical concern explaining the Court’s “dramatic departure from settled 
procedural law” is that juries might “mistakenly conclude that evidence of parallel 
conduct has proved that the parties acted pursuant to an agreement when they in fact 
merely made similar independent decisions”). 
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or legal issues, (c) adequacy of the representative parties to 
protect the interests of the class, and (d) typicality, in that the 
class claim must be typical of the plaintiffs’ individual claims 
generally.81 Finally, the Supreme Court reiterated in Comcast 
Corp. v. Behrend that district courts facing a class certification 
must undertake a rigorous analysis, and provided that the 
named plaintiff must show that damages can be determined for 
the entire class and not merely on an individual basis.82 The 
Court’s recent decisions demonstrate an effort to reign in 
private antitrust actions in favor of regulation and increase the 
standard for bringing such aggregated claims. 83  This 
conservatism reflects a tipping of the scale more toward the 
more limited approach to collective actions adopted by the UK 
and the European Commission. 
D. UK Competition Law and Representative Actions 
The Competition Act of 1998 (“CA98”) is the UK legislative 
equivalent to the United States’ Sherman Act and Clayton Act.84 
Chapter 1 Section 2 of the CA98 prohibits “[a]greements . . . 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition [within the 
United Kingdom],” whereas Chapter 2 Section 18 prohibits “any 
conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which 
amounts to an abuse of a dominant position in the market . . . 

81. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); see also General 
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 456 U.S. 147 (1982) (holding that a rigorous 
analysis should apply in class certification procedures); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
82. Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432, 1434 (2013) (referencing the 
appellate court holding that, at the class certification stage, plaintiffs must assure the 
courts that damages are “capable of measurement and will not require labyrinthine 
individual calculations”); see Sergio Campos, Opinion Analysis: No Common Ground, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-
no-common-ground (explaining that the majority in Comcast v. Behrend suggests that 
evidence of antitrust impact must also prove that “the case is susceptible to awarding 
damages on a class-wide basis”). 
83. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 644 (acknowledging the US Supreme Court’s 
advocacy of regulation over private enforcement in antitrust); Goldman, supra note 79, 
at 1058 (noting that in Twombly the US Supreme Court held that “simple allegations of 
parallel conduct with conclusory assertions of agreement could not survive a motion to 
dismiss”). 
84. Competition Act, 1998, c.41 (U.K.) (representing UK national competition 
law). 
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[that] may affect trade with the United Kingdom.” 85 
Enforcement of UK competition law falls chiefly to the OFT, 
which possesses the capacity to investigate companies suspected 
of CA98 violations.86 The OFT handles all public enforcement 
mechanisms of competition law and has the power to impose 
corporate and individual fines, as well as imprison guilty 
parties. 87  Challenged OFT decisions are reviewed by the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal (“CAT”).88 
Private enforcement through the courts is also a viable 
remedy in the United Kingdom.89 The government’s purported 
reforms aim to make the existing regime more robust.90 The 
government acknowledges that public policy aims support the 
reduction of barriers facing consumers and businesses in 

85. Competition Act, 1998, c.41, §§ 2, 18 (U.K.) (identifying collusive and 
monopolistic anticompetitive behavior as illegal under UK competition law). 
86. Competition Act and Cartels, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING–COMPETITION ACT AND 
CARTELS, http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/#.UrIOd
6W6ods (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). But see Clive Maxwell, United Kingdom: Office of Fair 
Trading, EUR. ANTITRUST REV. (2013), available at http://globalcompetition
review.com/reviews/53/sections/179/chapters/2127/ (declaring that in April 2014 
the competition and consumer protection duties of the OFT will be transferred to a 
new agency, the Competition Markets Authority). 
87. Competition Act and Cartels, supra note 86, Rule 20.5; see also Russell, supra note 
14, at 176 n.179 (noting that the OFT is responsible for establishing an antitrust 
infringement has taken place). 
88 . Home, COMPETITION APPEALS TRIBUNAL, Rule 20.5, http://
www.catribunal.org.uk (last visited Dec. 18, 2013); see also Russell, supra note 15, at 176 
n.179 (noting that representative actions can be brought in the CAT). 
89. OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that 
OFT research confirms that private actions are viewed as the least effective component 
of the competition regime); DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 10 (referencing only forty-one competition cases 
between 2005 and 2008 in which judgments were delivered). 
90. In a public consultation preceding the release of 2013–14 Consumer Rights 
Bill, the UK Secretary of State recognized that, “[w]hile the public competition 
authorities are at the heart of the regime, they have finite resources and cannot do 
everything. What is needed from Government is to create the legal framework that will 
empower individual consumers and businesses to represent their own interests.” 
OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 3; DEP’T FOR BUS. 
INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that reforms 
to private actions are needed to complement public enforcement by “[e]mpowering 
and enabling businesses and consumers to take direct action against anticompetitive 
behavior”). 
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pursuing private actions, as the uncurbed costs of 
anticompetitive behavior take a toll on society collectively.91 
The UK collective redress scheme for competition cases 
allows for follow-on procedures in which a “specified body” can 
bring an action on behalf of consumers who have suffered 
losses.92 The entity must fulfill a set of criteria to demonstrate 
that the body is capable and eligible to bring a legitimate 
representative action. 93  Furthermore, any consumers 
represented in the action must have given the entity explicit 
consent to act on the consumers’ behalf. 94  The permission 
requirement places the existing UK collective redress scheme 
within the “opt-in” model, which is diametrically opposed to the 
“opt-out” US-style class action.95 The opt-in model requires that 
individual claimants actively choose to join the collective action 
by giving permission for the representative body to litigate on 
their behalf, whereas the opt-out model automatically litigates 
on behalf of all eligible claimants and allows individuals to 
withdraw from the suit.96 The impact of the opt-in approach has 
been controversial and has produced mixed results, which 
account for the United Kingdom currently undergoing a shift in 
policy.97 

91. OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 14; GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, supra note 26, at 52 (U.K.) 
(“Anti-competitive behavior can result in lower output, higher prices, and reduced 
choice and innovation.”). 
92 . Howells, supra note 2, 4–5 (outlining the relevant features of the UK 
Competition Act of 1998). 
93. Howells, supra note 2, at 5 (a representative action can be brought by a body 
that (1) “is so constituted, managed and controlled as to be expected to act 
independently, impartially and with complete integrity;” (2) “is able to demonstrate 
that it represents and/or protects the interests of consumers;” (3) “has the capability to 
take forward a claim on behalf of consumers;” and (4) “the trading arm [of the body] 
does not control the body, and any profits of the trading body are only used to further 
the stated objectives of the body”). 
94. Howells, supra note 2, at 5; see DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 32 (critiquing the opt-in model as it requires potential 
plaintiffs “to link themselves to a case before they know what the damages are, or even 
if it is successful”). 
95. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 
27 (referencing the existing limited opt-in regime for collective action cases). 
96. See generally Howells, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
97. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, 
supra note 26, at 52–55. See generally DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS— 2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 30–35 (expressing the opt-in model’s general failure to 
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In 2008, the CJC published a report making a number of 
recommendations for how the UK government might improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of collective action procedures.98 
One of the CJC’s suggested reforms represented a particularly 
dramatic regime shift, recommending that collective actions be 
brought on an opt-in or opt-out basis.99 The Consumer Rights 
Act 2014, which was first published in June 2013 and formally 
introduced in the House of Commons in January 2014, adopted 
some of the key recommendations suggested in the CJC report, 
including the establishment of a limited opt-out mechanism.100 
E. Competition Regimes and Collective Redress in the European Union 
Antitrust enforcement operates within a two-tiered system 
in the European Union, both at the Member State level and at 
the community level. 101  Member States (e.g., the United 
Kingdom) abide by their national competition regimes, each 
with a unique set of laws and mechanisms for public and private 
enforcement.102 While the majority of EU Member States have 
not embraced US-style class actions generally, some have 
implemented other mechanisms for collective action in 

provide a viable mechanism for bringing collective competition claims and noting the 
shift toward offering an opt-out alternative). 
98. SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 21–23. 
99. SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 145–50; Collective Redress Across the Pond— 
Interview with Matthew Shankland & Lianne Craig, METRO. CORP. COUNS. 18 (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/October/18.pdf (stating that the 
adoption of the CJC recommendations by the UK competition enforcement regime 
“would represent a significant shift in the current position in England and also take 
[the United Kingdom] a step beyond where the European Commission and other 
European Member States seem to be going with collective redress”). 
100. Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] sch. 8, 103–117 (U.K.); Consumer Rights Bill 2013-14: Progress of the Bill, U.K. 
PARLIAMENT, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/consumerrights.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (indicating that the Consumer Rights Bill is currently in the 
committee stage of the parliamentary review process). 
101. Chieu, supra note 12, at 131; Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2716 (providing 
that the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition works in 
partnership with national competition authorities and courts in a policy-making 
capacity to “strengthen private enforcement in the member state courts”). 
102. Chieu, supra note 12, at 131; see Russell, supra note 14, at 167 (adding that 
national competition authorities are also empowered to enforce community law under 
Articles 81 and 82, which are now Articles 101 and 102 respectively). 
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competition cases in recent years.103 Member State legislation 
providing collective redress options—in France, Germany, Italy, 
and Sweden, for example— has taken many different forms.104 
For instance, Germany now allows for some collective actions 
that are limited to injunctive relief, and the Swedish Parliament 
passed the 2002 Group Proceeding Act, which allows for 
collective action procedures in all areas of civil law.105 In 2004, 
the Netherlands adopted the Collective Settlement of Mass 
Damages Act, which provides broad class action rules, as well as 
a US-style opt-out provision.106 
At the community level, the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Competition (“DG Competition”) is 
charged with the responsibility of monitoring and eliminating 
anti-competitive practices perpetrated by undertakings within 
the internal market.107 The Commission has the authority to 
investigate alleged violations of competition law and, if an 
infringement is found, the Commission may impose fines.108 The 

103. Chieu, supra note 12, at 141 (noting that many EU Member States are “still 
skeptical of the idea that private mechanisms, through the use of class actions and 
public enforcement . . . can together improve the legal system in Europe”); see, e.g., 
Russell, supra note 14, at 168. 
104. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 647 n.120; Russell, supra note 14, at 168 (“Several 
European jurisdictions have either implemented legislation that makes it easier for 
claimants to bring group or class actions, or are currently considering implementing 
legislation, especially in the consumer protection context.”). 
105. See Group Proceedings Act (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) 
(Swed.) (providing that “group action means an action that a plaintiff brings as the 
representative of several persons with legal effects for them, although they are not 
parties to the case”); Russell, supra note 14, at 168. 
106. Russell, supra note 14, at 168; Hélène van Lith, The Dutch Collective Settlements 
Act and Private International Law—Aspecten van Internationaal Privaatrecht in de WCAM, 
Research and Documentation Centre, Ministry of Justice—WODC, Ministerie van 
Veiligheid en Justitie (2010), 16 (Neth.) (reporting on the Dutch Act on the Collective 
Settlement of Mass Damage Claims, which provides for collective redress). 
107. Chieu, supra note 12, at 131; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/
factsheet_general_en.pdf. The internal market is “an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provision of the Treaties [of the European Union].”  Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 26(2), 2012 O.J. 
C 326/47, at 59 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
108. Commission Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to 
Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, 2006 O.J. C 210/2, at 2 (“(1) . . . the 
Commission may, by decision, impose fines on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings where, whether intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 81 or 82 
of the Treaty.”); European Comm’n Competition-Antitrust, Overview (Jan. 17, 2014), 
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cornerstone legislation of the European Union competition 
regime lies in Article 101 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).109 Similar to the 
US approach, Article 101 prohibits all agreements between 
undertakings that may affect trade among the Member States in 
such a way as to prevent, restrict or distort competition within 
the internal market. 110  Article 102 forbids the abuse of a 
dominant position within the internal market, so far as the 
abuse may affect trade among the Member States.111 
There is no existing judicial forum at the community level 
where private claims under European competition law may be 
brought.112  The lack of private enforcement mechanisms to 
complement the EU public enforcement scheme, led by DG 
Competition, has prompted exploration of ways in which the 
European Union may implement a private right to damages.113 
In recent years, the Commission has published a series of 
documents exploring different policy options to create a space 
for private litigation.114 The culmination of the work conducted 
in this area has been the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive 

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html; Sittenreich, supra note 
8, at 2716 (noting that the Commission can investigate potential antitrust violations “on 
application by a Member State or on its own initiative” and can impose “tremendous 
fines”). 
109. Formerly Article 81 and Article 82, respectively, of the EC Treaty (“Treaty of 
Rome”). EUROPA—APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU, http://europa.eu/
 legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26092_en.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
110. TFEU, supra note 107, art. 101(1), 2012 O.J. 326 at 88–89 (prohibiting 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices between undertakings that have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the internal 
market). 
111. Id. art. 102, at 89 (prohibiting abuse of a dominant position within the 
internal market by one or more undertakings). 
112. Chieu, supra note 12, at 133. Green Paper 2005, supra note 3, at 4 (noting 
that Community courts have no original jurisdiction in damages claims for 
infringements of antitrust laws). 
113. Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 
final (Nov. 2008), 7 [hereinafter Commission Green Paper 2008] (providing a number 
of options to address the unsatisfactory status of consumer redress in the European 
Union); Commission Green Paper 2005, supra note 3, at 8–9 (posing the question of 
whether special procedures should be made available for bringing collective actions). 
114. Chieu, supra note 12, at 134–36; see Commission Green Paper 2005, supra 
note 3; Commission White Paper 2008, supra note 2; Commission Green Paper 2008, 
supra note 113. 
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on Antitrust Damages Claims, and a Recommendation for 
collective redress mechanisms in Europe.115 
As noted by Dr. S.I. Strong, “the patchwork nature of 
regional legislation and the inconsistent availability and nature 
of national forms of collective relief have raised questions as to 
whether the current state of affairs is hindering the proper 
operation of the internal market.”116 At the community level, the 
Commission Recommendations on collective redress 
mechanisms in the Member States provide a specific set of 
guidelines—assessed subsequently in Part II and Part III—to 
encourage and help streamline standards, processes, and 
procedures across the region.117 
A range of desired objectives support the introduction of 
collective action into UK and EU justice systems, including 
broader access to justice, market rectification, judicial economy, 
deterrence, and increased private enforcement. The reviewed 
literature, however, also details the critiques of the US class 
action model, particularly relating to the principal-agent 
problem and the threat of unmeritorious litigation. In their 
respective policy positions, the UK government and the 
European Commission articulate a need for enhanced private 
enforcement mechanisms to complement public enforcement 
efforts. In the same breath, both bodies express a parallel goal 
of protecting domestic legal traditions from the perceived 
abuses associated with US-style class actions. Therefore, 

115. Proposal for a Directive on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages 
Under National Law Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member 
States and the European Union, COM (2013) 404 final (June 2013); Commission 
Recommendation, supra note 1. 
116. S.I. Strong, Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union: Constitutional 
Rights in the Face of the Brussels I Regulation, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 236 (2013); 
Commission Green Paper 2008, supra note 113, at 4 (noting that the thirteen Member 
States with judicial collective redress mechanisms take very different approaches and 
have diverse results). 
117. Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 62 (providing that “Member 
States should have collective redress mechanisms at national level . . . which respect the 
basic principles set out in this Recommendation . . . [and these] principles should be 
common across the Union”); Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 5 
(noting that the Commission “deems it necessary to increase policy coherence and to 
take a horizontal approach on collective redress”); Russell, supra note 14, at 169 (“The 
inconsistent and piecemeal attempts by Member States to introduce collective actions 
highlight the need for a community-wide response from the EU.”). 
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mechanisms established by the advocated reforms in the UK and 
EU also must be evaluated with respect to these aims. 
II. CRITICISMS AND PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
COLLECTIVE ACTION QUESTION 
Despite affirmations in the United Kingdom and the 
European Union that collective action mechanisms are a 
necessity in antitrust enforcement, both jurisdictions have 
expressed a clear intention to avoid the approach fostered in the 
United States.118 The US-style class action model has undergone 
severe criticism by policymakers, scholars, and practitioners 
across borders.119 In this Part, the legal solutions proffered by 
the UK government and European Commission are described in 
Part II.A and Part II.B, respectively. 
A. The UK Legislative Response to Collective Action in Antitrust: The 
Consumer Rights Act of 2014 
Of the private competition enforcement reforms proposed 
in the Consumer Rights Act 2014, two key elements stand out.120 
The first is the expansion of eligible representative bodies to 
bring collective action suits before the CAT. 121  Under the 

118. See Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 3 (contending that 
the US class action model attracts abusive litigation and that any European approach to 
collective redress must “give proper thought to preventing these negative effects and 
devising adequate safeguards against them”); GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, supra note 26, at 54 (providing that while 
the UK Government proposes reforms to collective redress more accessible, a range of 
safeguards would be implemented in order to prevent US-style class actions from taking 
root). 
119. See, e.g., Sittenreich, supra note 8, at 2712 n.81 (providing examples of the 
resistance and hostility toward suggestions that the European Union adopt the U.S.-
style litigation culture in antitrust private enforcement); Hodges, supra note 5, at 372 
(referencing a political consensus in Europe that the US-style class action gives rise to 
“highly undesirable adverse effects”). 
120. See Consumer Rights Bill , Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. 
Bill [161] (U.K.). 
121. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, 
supra note 26, at 53–54 (juxtaposing the current regime allowing for only Which? to 
bring a claim on behalf of a limited group of potential plaintiffs with the proposed 
regime where any representative group could bring an action and eligible plaintiffs 
would automatically be included in proposals); Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in 
Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill [161] (U.K.); 47B Collective Proceedings before the 
Tribunal, sch. 8, at 105 (U.K.) (providing that the Tribunal may authorize a party to act 
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existing regime, only the largest consumer rights body in the 
UK—called “Which?”—has the ability to bring forward a 
competition collective action suit. 122  Under the proposed 
reforms, any representative group or trade association may have 
standing to bring an action.123 While the legislation’s aim is to 
broaden the pool of representatives, the government also set 
parameters; the OFT notes that to ensure collective actions are 
managed in the best interests of claimants alone—and not in the 
interest of a third party agent—law firms, third party funders, 
and special purpose vehicles are precluded from acting as 
representative bodies.124 
The second key reform set forth by the UK government is 
the introduction of a limited opt-out collective action regime.125 
Of all the suggested reforms, the adoption of the opt-out model 
was subject to the highest degree of debate; opposition to the 
opt-out model voiced apprehension about the rise of frivolous 
litigation and a litigation culture.126 Under the current opt-in 

as the representative “only if the Tribunal considers that it is just and reasonable for 
that person to act as a representative”). 
122. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, 
supra note 26, at 53 (“Under the current regime, only Which? can take forward a group, 
or ‘collective’ action . . . and on an ‘opt-in’ basis.”); see Competition Litigation: Major New 
Proposals from the EU and the UK, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT], http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
knowledge/publications/99667/competition-litigation-major-new-proposals-from-the-
eu-and-the-uk (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (noting that the current limited jurisdiction 
of the Cat allows only the consumer association Which? to bring claims). 
123. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, 
supra note 26, at 54; NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 122 (“The collective actions 
could be brought by any appropriate consumer representative body or trade 
association – much wider than the existing procedure.”). 
124. UK Government Publishes Draft Consumer Rights Bill Including Proposed Reforms to 
Private Actions in Competition Law, HOGAN LOVELLS (Nov. 2013), http://
ehoganlovells.com/cv/200eb9dd8e3a96ecc1a38dd5600e18c45c71e025/p=4859753 
[hereinafter HOGAN LOVELLS]; SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 143 (recommending 
that “law firms, especially alternative business structures, would not be suitable bodies 
for authorization or ad hoc certification” so as to avoid a lawyer-led culture of 
litigation). 
125. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.), at 105 (allowing for opt-out collective proceedings under section 10). 
126. See OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 30 (noting 
the heated debate surrounding an opt-out collective action regime); see also DEP’T FOR 
BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 34 (noting concerns 
that an opt-out model would lead to a US-style class action procedure that “allegedly 
led to instances of large businesses settling for significant sums simply to avoid the cost 
of further litigation”). 
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regime, eligible consumers have to actively join the action in 
order to benefit from damages.127 The government ultimately 
decided not to abandon the existing opt-in system, but instead 
to incorporate an alternative opt-out approach.128 Under the 
new opt-out regime, qualified consumers who are domiciled in 
the United Kingdom are automatically eligible for an award of 
damages, unless they opt-out of the suit.129 To assuage fears 
associated with the implementation of an opt-out model, the 
legislation provides for safeguards designed to avoid an US-style 
class action, which include a certification mechanism, a 
proscription of treble damages and a ban against contingency 
fees.130 
The government requires the CAT to certify collective 
action suits.131 In a 2012 Consultation on Options for Reform, 

127. See GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, 
supra note 26, at 53–54 (noting also that under the current regime consumers are 
required to provide evidence of their eligibility, i.e. proof of purchase of a product they 
potentially bought several years before); see also Howells, supra note 2, at 5 (“Affected 
consumers must have given the specified body permission to act on their behalf.”). 
128. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.), at 105 (“(10) ‘Opt-in collective proceedings’ are collective proceedings 
which are brought on behalf of each class member who opts in by notifying the 
representative, in a manner and by a time specified, that the claim should be included 
in the collective proceedings. (11) ‘Opt-out collective proceedings’ are collective 
proceedings which are brought on behalf of each class member except – (a) any class 
member who opts out by notifying the representative, in a manner and by a time 
specified, that the claim should not be included in the collective proceedings . . .”); see 
also OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 30 (defending the 
government’s decision to employ an opt-out regime by demonstrating that the existing 
system was ineffective, reforming the opt-in model likely would not increase access to 
justice, some cases could practically be brought only on an opt-out basis, and consumer 
groups had agreed not to take another case under the opt-in system). 
129. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.), at 105. 
130. See GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, 
supra note 26, at 54; see also DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 55-58 (outlining in detail measures including 
certification, damages, costs and fees). 
131. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
2, at 55 (outlining the design details of a proposed opt-out collective action regime, 
including a preliminary certification process); OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 6 (identifying “strict judicial certification of cases” to ensure 
that only cases with merit would go forward); see also NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra 
note 122 (providing that the CAT would issue a collective proceeding order in which it 
defines the class of persons included in the suit and specifies whether the case should 
proceed on an opt-in or opt-out basis). 
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the government suggested a series of design details for the 
proposed opt-out regime, including a preliminary merits test 
that would assess the reasonability that material issues of fact 
and law will be resolved at trial in favor of the class.132 As part of 
the certification evaluation, the CAT must review the adequacy 
of the representative body, and whether collective action is the 
best means of bringing the particular case. 133  Toward this 
assessment, the CAT may require minimum standards, such as: 
Numerosity—A threshold number of claimants is met; 
Commonality—A sufficient commonality of issues among 
claimants is present; 
Representation—The individual or body bringing the suit 
adequately represents the claimants collectively and poses 
no conflict of interests;134 
Funds—The representative body has sufficient funds to 
cover the defendant’s costs, should the case be unsuccessful; 
Suitable Means—Collective action is the most suitable way 
to resolve issues common among the claimants.135 
The damages awarded in collective action suits will be 
limited to an amount that compensates the claimants for their 

132. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
2, at 55 (citing Ontario Law Reform Commission Report (1982)). But see Response to the 
Department for Business Innovation & Skills’ Consultation on the Draft Consumer Rights Bill, 
BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER (Sept. 12, 2013) http://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-
insights/articles/blps-response-to-bis-consultation-on-the-draft-consumer-rights-bill/ 
(noting that the specific factors to determine certification have not yet been released 
and will be set out in revised CAT rules). 
133. See OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 40 (“The 
Government has . . . decided that there should be a strong process of judicial 
certification, including a preliminary merits test, an assessment of the adequacy of the 
representative and a requirement that a collective action must be the best way of 
bringing the case.”); see also DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 55 (noting that a certification process is the most 
suitable way of preventing unsuitable cases from clogging the courts’ dockets). 
134. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
2, at 55 (if the representative is an individual, his/her claim must be typical of the 
group’s claims. Other representative bodies or entities must suitably represent the 
claimants’ interests).  
135. See id. (proffering a preliminary process of certification to bring forth 
collective actions in competition cases); see also HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 124 
(clarifying that the review of case suitability for collective redress will consider whether 
the claims raise the “same, similar or related issues of fact or law”). 
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losses and does not reflect additional ‘exemplary’ damages.136 In 
the 2012 public consultation leading up to the Consumer Rights 
Bill drafting, the government expressed that treble damages, or 
punitive damages, provide an incentive for claimants to bring 
cases under competition law that would be classed more 
accurately as contract law cases, in order to benefit from the 
inflated compensation. 137  Another voiced critique of treble 
damages relates to the effect on settlements; the government’s 
response to the Consultation submissions cites Cleary Gottlieb 
Steen and Hamilton LLP’s position on this issue: “[W]e agree 
that it is unfair for a company to be pushed into settling for fear 
of treble [or punitive] damages where, as is normally the case in 
litigation, it is not certain of being able to successfully defend 
the claim.”138 
Contingency fees or “damages-based agreements” 
(“DBAs”)—payable only where the result is a favorable one—are 
also prohibited in opt-out collective action cases brought before 
the CAT.139 It is the government’s view that DBAs encourage 
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136. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra note 122 (noting that damages in 
collective actions should be limited to compensating claimants for experienced losses 
and prohibiting a punitive approach will prevent excessive damages awards); Consumer 
Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill [161] (U.K.), at 106 
(“47C Collective proceedings: damages and costs. “(1) The Tribunal may not award 
exemplary damages in collective proceedings.”). 
137. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
2, at 56 (noting also that, while treble or punitive damages provides an incentive for 
claimants to bring cases and thereby enforce the competition regime, such 
justifications “carry less weight in the [United Kingdom] where the bulk of 
enforcement activity, including fining, is undertaken by the public competition 
authorities”). But see Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 642 (outlining the utility of multiple 
damages in antitrust actions, including the covertness of antitrust violations and the 
subsequent difficulty in detecting and prosecuting them, the challenge in re-creating a 
‘but-for’ market to use as a yardstick in calculating damages, the needed incentive for 
claimants to bring claims in view of the complexity and cost of antitrust litigation, the 
higher degree of deterrence of multiple damages, and the validity of punitive damages 
in cases of antitrust violations that serve no purpose other than to destroy competition). 
138. See OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 36 (“The 
great majority of respondents agreed that treble damages should not be allowed in 
collective actions.”); see also DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 56 (opining that a treble damages system “distorts the 
relative incentives between fighting a case and settling, unfairly penalizing defendants 
who may not have committed any fault”). 
139. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.), at 106 (“(7) A damages-based agreement is unenforceable if it relates to 
opt-out collective proceedings.”); see also GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS 
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speculative litigation, where defendants face unjustified costs 
and claimants attorneys are tempted to focus only on large 
cases.140 Furthermore, the “loser-pays” rule shall continue to 
apply, as the government views the rule as a safeguard against 
frivolous cases and views the “loser-pays” principle as a matter of 
fairness. 141  In the interests of enhancing access to justice, 
however, the government aims to preserve some discretion to 
cost-cap to ensure that a small claimant is not held liable for an 
extraordinary sum of legal fees accrued by a much better funded 
defendant.142 
Opt-out settlements must be judicially approved.143 In an 
effort to ensure fairness toward the action’s claimants, approval 
of opt-out settlements includes consideration of the 
reasonableness of attorneys fees paid to the claimants’ 
representatives. 144  Furthermore, claimants are offered the 
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ON CONSUMER RIGHTS 2013, supra note 26, at 54 (asserting that a ban on contingency 
fees, based on the success of the outcome, will help prevent US-style class actions). 
140. See OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 41 (noting 
that the Government and many respondents viewed a ban on contingency fees as a key 
safeguard in avoiding the rise of a “litigation culture”); see also DEP’T FOR BUS. 
INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 57–58 (arguing that 
contingency fees could “unduly distort the incentives” to litigate, i.e. artificially 
inflating the number of claimants, encouraging spurious litigation, and encouraging 
attorneys to focus only on large cases). 
141. See OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 41 (noting 
the unfairness where “a defendant which wins a case had to pay its own legal costs”, 
and justness where “a claimant which wins should be able to reclaim its costs”); see also 
DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 35 (“The 
preservation of the loser-pays rule in collective actions is also critical in ensuring 
fairness for defendants and a check on unmeritorious claims.”). 
142. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
2, at 57 (adding that “Cost capping can reduce the incentives to run up costs and 
provide certainty for claimants, meaning that meritorious cases that might not 
otherwise be brought would be more likely to occur”); see also OPTIONS REFORM—
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 41 (noting that while the loser-pays rule 
should apply in the vast majority of cases, there are special circumstance where cost-
capping should occur in order to preserve access to justice). 
143. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.) (“49A Collective settlements: where a collective proceeding order has 
been made. “(2) An application for approval of a proposed collective settlement must 
be made to the Tribunal by the representative and the defendant in the collective 
proceedings.”); see also OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 43 
(providing the Government’s decision that any opt-out settlement must be judicially 
approved). 
144. See OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 43 (adding 
that underlying claimants must be given an opportunity to opt-out of the settlement). 
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opportunity to opt-out of the settlement and preserve individual 
claimant autonomy.145 
B. The EU Response to Collective Action in Antitrust: Recommendation 
for the Member States 
The European Union has offered its own answer to the 
collective redress question.146 In June 2013, the Commission 
issued a Recommendation setting out a series of principles for 
collective redress mechanisms to be adopted voluntarily by the 
Member States. 147  The aim is to improve access to justice 
through collective redress mechanisms while relying on the 
Member States’ procedural safeguards to prevent abusive 
litigation.148 
Similar to the UK approach, the European Commission 
aims to set conditions that the representative body must satisfy 
in order to achieve certification and recommends that the 
representative possess “sufficient capacity in terms of financial 
resources, human resources, and legal expertise” to effectively 
represent the aggregated claims of the group. 149  Also 
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145. See Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.), at 110 (“(10) But a collective settlement is not binding on a person who – 
(a) opts out . . . .”); see also OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 
43 (adding that “underlying claimants” must also be given an opportunity to opt-out of 
the settlement). 
146. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 1. But see NORTON ROSE 
FULBRIGHT, supra note 122 (noting that a Recommendation, unlike a Directive, is not 
legally binding on the Member States). 
147 . See Commission Recommendation, supra note 1; see also Press Release, 
European Commission, Commission Recommends Member States to Have Collective 
Redress Mechanisms in Place to Ensure Effective Access to Justice (June 11, 2013) 
[hereinafter European Commission Press Release 2013], available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-13-524_en.htm (providing that the Commission’s 
Recommendation promotes a coherent approach across the Member States without 
requiring the harmonization of national systems). 
148. See European Commission Press Release 2013, supra note 147 (noting also 
that the Recommendation was meant to complement a proposed Directive on antitrust 
damages intended to help citizens and businesses overcome obstacles in obtaining 
compensation for competition infringements); see also NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, supra 
note 122 (stating that Recommendation is a “clear sign of the European Commission’s 
determination to encourage the victims of competition law infringements to recover 
their losses” and the proposals are meant to set the direction and limits on collective 
action regimes in the European Union). 
149. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 62–63 (outlining the 
standing upon which a body may bring a representative action); see also Commission 
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comparable to the UK approach, the Commission sets 
boundaries for the scope of entities eligible to represent 
claimants, emphasizing that the representative body, in order to 
have legal standing, must act genuinely in the best interest of 
the group, and not for the representative’s own profit.150 Toward 
that end, the Commission specifies that only bodies of non-
profit character are suitable to bring collective actions, as they 
are “guided by the interests of those affected in situations of 
mass damages.”151 
One of the most significant distinctions between the 
European approach to collective redress and that of the United 
Kingdom and the United States is the recommendation of an 
opt-in model.152 The Commission’s endorsement of the opt-in 
model recommends that Member States require claimants to 
actively choose to become a part of the represented group, at 
which point the resulting judgment is binding; but those who do 
not opt-in to the collective proceedings maintain the right to 
pursue a damages claim individually. 153  The prevailing 
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Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 9 (clarifying that legal standing should be 
granted to the representative body upon its qualification in advance, and that the 
conditions for legal standing are stipulated in the Commission’s Recommendation). 
150. See Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 10 (providing that as 
the representative entity alone acts on behalf of claimants, then the entity must be 
trusted to act in the best interest of the represented group, and not for own profit); see 
also Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 63 (stating that “there should be a 
direct relationship between the main objectives of the entity and the rights granted 
under Union law that are claimed to have been violated in respect of which the action 
is brought”). 
151. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 62 (providing that in 
order to have standing to bring a representative action, “the entity should have a non-
profit making character”); European Commission Press Release 2013, supra note 147 
(noting that by permitting only entities of a non-profit character to represent claimants, 
the Commission aims to discourage abuse in the collective redress regime). 
152. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 64 (providing as a specific 
principle relating to compensatory collective redress that “The claimant party should 
be formed on the basis of express consent of the natural or legal persons claiming to 
have been harmed (‘opt-in’ principle)”); see also Commission Communication 2013, 
supra note 22, at 12 (stating that the Commission takes the view that the opt-in method 
should form the basis of the European horizontal framework on collective redress). 
153. See Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that the 
opt-in model “guarantees that the judgment will not bind other potential qualified 
claimants who did not join”); see also European Commission Press Release 2013, supra 
note 147 (providing that under the opt-in method, claimant parties must directly 
express consent for the representative party to bring the collective action on their 
behalf). 
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understanding of the Commission is that the opt-in model 
preserves the parties’ autonomy and “respects the right of a 
person to decide whether to participate or not.” 154  The 
Commission further lauds the perceived advantages of the opt-in 
system, e.g., the value of the collective dispute can be more 
easily determined, the court is in a better position to determine 
both the merits of the case and the admissibility of the collective 
action, and the apparent certainty that the judgment will not 
bind other qualified claimants who did not opt into the claim.155 
Additional safeguards proffered by the Commission to 
mitigate the incentives for abuse associated with class action suits 
largely reflect those safeguards adopted in the UK. 156  For 
instance, the Commission recommends a prohibition of 
contingency fees as well as treble, or punitive, damages.157 The 
bar against contingency fees, both in the European Union and 
the United Kingdom, is a source of skepticism among 
practitioners who weigh the risks and rewards in bringing 
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154. See Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 12 (contrasting the 
opt-out model as a remedy that prevents potential claimants from making an informed 
decision on whether to pursue the claim); see also  European Commission Press Release 
2013, supra note 147 (adding that “the Recommendation “stresses the need to provide 
information to potential claimants who may wish to join the collective action”). 
155. Commission Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 12 (juxtaposing the 
proposed benefits of the opt-in model with the disadvantages of the opt-out model, 
including the perception that the opt-out system is inconsistent with the compensatory 
aim of collective redress, as some claimants who are unidentified cannot receive the 
awarded damages); Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, supra note 9, at 21 (arguing 
that the opt-in model is preferable because it is more similar to traditional litigation 
and more easily implemented at the national level, and because opt-out regimes in 
other jurisdictions are perceived to lead to excesses, increased risk that claimants lose 
control of the proceedings, and increased risk that the attorney pursues his or her own 
interests before those of the claimants). 
156. See European Commission Press Release 2013, supra note 147 (noting that 
the Commission recommended “important procedural safeguards to make sure there 
are no incentives to abuse collective redress systems”); Commission Communication 
2013, supra note 22, at 6 (stating that the proposed collective redress system should 
include safeguards against abusive litigation and mitigate the economic incentives to 
bringing meritless claims). 
157. Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 64–65 (“The Member States 
should not permit contingency fees” and “punitive damages, leading to 
overcompensation in favour of the claimant party . . . should be prohibited”); 
European Commission Press Release 2013, supra note 147 (reiterating the 
Commission’s recommendation that contingency fees and punitive damages should be 
prohibited). 
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collective antitrust actions.158 Finally, the Commission and all the 
stakeholders who participated in the public consultation agreed 
that the loser-pays principle—which is deeply embedded in the 
legal traditions across Europe—must also apply in cases of 
collective action.159 
While the UK Consumer Rights Act and the EU 
Recommendation share some similarities—such as a prohibition 
of contingency fees and treble damages, and a reiteration of the 
loser pays rule regarding attorney’s fees and other litigation 
costs—the two bodies take different directions on other 
points.160 For example, the United Kingdom adopted a limited 
opt-out approach toward collective action, whereas the 
European Union recommends a strictly opt-in model.161 Also, 
where the United Kingdom recognizes the legal standing of any 
representative group or trade association to bring a collective 
action, the European Union recommends that the 
representative entity be of a non-profit character.162 Nonetheless, 
both require that the body bringing the action be certified to 
represent the aggregated claims and both consider a variety of 
factors toward this making the certification determination.163 

158. Melissa Lipman, Plaintiffs Attys Say EU Antitrust Litigation Plan Falls Short, 
LAW360, June 12, 2013, http://www.law360.com/articles/449387/plaintiffs-attys-say-eu-
antitrust-litigation-plan-falls-short (noting that the risks outweigh the incentives for 
attorneys bringing collective antitrust claims when contingency fees are off the table) 
(quoting Daniel Small, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC). 
159. Commission Recommendation, supra note 1, at 63 (“(13) The Member 
States should ensure that the party that loses a collective redress action reimburses 
necessary legal costs borne by the winning party (‘loser pays principle’)”); Commission 
Communication 2013, supra note 22, at 9, 16 (identifying the loser-pays rule as a central 
safeguards against abusive litigation and noting the total agreement among 
stakeholders and the Commission on its inclusion in the proposed collective redress 
regime). 
160. Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.); OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, see supra note 141 and 
accompanying text; Commission Recommendation, see supra note 157, note 159 and 
accompanying text. 
161. Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.); see supra notes 125, 152 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 123, 151 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 135, 149 and accompanying text. 
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III. ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF PROPOSED COLLECTIVE 
REDRESS REFORMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
EUROPEAN UNION 
To competently evaluate the efficacy of the UK Draft 
Consumer Rights Bill and the EU Recommendations for 
collective redress mechanisms, the fit between the desired ends 
and the selected means must be assessed. The specific question 
pondered in this analysis is: Will the legal framework and tools 
adopted in these legislative proposals effectively achieve the 
intended goals of creating avenues for collective redress in the 
competition arena? Part III assesses the capacity of the 
mechanisms and safeguards proposed to implement collective 
redress schemes that will meet the goals expressed by the UK 
government and the European Commission. Three key critiques 
are offered to identify and assess the weaknesses of the proposed 
reforms. Part III.A questions sources of litigation funding, Part 
III.B appraises the certification process, and Part III.C evaluates 
the opt-in/opt-out debate. The resulting analysis is cautiously 
optimistic toward the prospective success of the UK approach, 
but skeptical as to the capacity of the EU proposal to achieve a 
robust and responsible collective action system in private 
antitrust enforcement. 
A. Funding Disincentives 
Funding collective redress claims remains a persistent 
problem and stands to critically undermine the legislative efforts 
in both the United Kingdom and the European Union to 
strengthen collective redress in antitrust claims.164 The United 
Kingdom and European Union approaches bar contingency 
fees.165 This prohibition reflects the legal traditions of both 
jurisdictions, as well as an effort to actively mitigate the threat of 
abusive litigation. 166  The underlying principle is that 
contingency fees encourage entrepreneurial lawyers to pursue a 

164. See Lipman, supra note 158. 
165. Consumer Rights Bill, Private Actions in Competition Law, 2014, H.C. Bill 
[161] (U.K.); Commission Recommendation, supra note 157; supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
166. Berrisch et al., supra note 57; OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, 
supra note 140; supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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high volume of claims, regardless of whether the claims have 
merit.167 The aggregation of a large number of claims may 
pressure defendants to settle, even if the claims are frivolous, 
which would promote the litigious culture both jurisdictions 
seek to avoid.168 If contingency fees are prohibited, however, 
what are the practical alternatives for funding collective 
litigation? 
The European Commission recognizes that private third 
parties may act as both an opportunity for funding as well as a 
source of abuse, and acknowledges the need for proper 
regulation.169 The practicality of the Commission’s proposed 
solution is questionable because, after all, what is the likelihood 
that third-party funders with limited budgets will be eager to 
finance collective actions where there are no contingency fees? 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys would take on great risk and cost to bring 
collective actions with no incentive of a damages-based 
reward. 170  Furthermore, the opt-in collective redress model 
promoted by the Commission shrinks the size of the represented 
claimant group.171 Consequently, third party funders face the 
added challenge of aggregating enough claims to cover the 
litigation costs. 
The gravity of the funding hurdle is compounded by the 
pledge to uphold the loser pays rule in both jurisdictions.172 
Claimants must consider not only how they will fund their own 

167. See supra note 73–75 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra note 65, 75 and accompanying text. 
169. Commission Communication 2013, supra note 149, at 15 (referencing the 
Commission Communication encouraging Member States to make third-party 
financing subject to conditions via a transparent approval system that ensures the best 
interests of claimants are served); see supra note 149 and accompanying text (setting 
parameters regarding third party financers). 
170. See Lipman, supra note 158 (noting that attorneys likely will be skeptical of 
bringing collective antitrust claims without the financial incentive of contingency fees, 
or damages-based arrangements). 
171. SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 90 (identifying the third party funding 
problem as a disadvantage to the opt-in approach because there must be “enough 
claimants to cover the high cost of bringing the action”); Commission Staff Working 
Paper 2008, supra note 9, at 20 (affirming that the opt-in collective action system 
usually results in a smaller claimant pool than in the opt-out model). 
172. OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 141; Commission 
Recommendation, supra note 159 (noting that the loser-pays rule is a legal tradition in 
UK and EU jurisdictions that, for the foreseeable future, will carry into the proposed 
collective action regimes in antitrust enforcement). 
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action, but also how they will fund the defendant’s legal costs in 
the event that the damages suit is unsuccessful.173 The pairing of 
the loser pays rule with the prohibition of contingency fees act 
together as a weighty disincentive for claimants to bring 
competition damages actions before the courts. Therefore, in an 
effort to curtail abusive litigation, the European Union and 
United Kingdom undercut the primary mutual objective of 
encouraging competition-related private actions by opening up 
avenues for collective redress. 
B. Certification of the Representative Entity 
It is unclear whether the certification process heralded by 
both the UK and EU proposals will provide any added 
protection against the pitfalls of the US class action model, as 
they share many of the same fundamental criteria. 174  As a 
safeguard against abusive collective litigation, both the United 
Kingdom and the European Union seek to implement a 
rigorous certification process required for the representative 
body to bring the aggregated claims.175 The UK’s certification 
analysis may include a number of possible factors, which were 
proffered in the 2012 public consultation on the matter; these 
factors included numerosity, commonality, representation 
adequacy, funding, and suitability.176 Similarly, the European 
Commission recommends that the representative body have 
sufficient funding, be a suitable entity to bring a collective claim, 
and be free from conflict of interests.177 
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173.  OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 141 ; Commission 
Recommendation, supra note 159 and accompanying text (illustrating what the loser-
pays rule entails and identifies it as a safeguard against the threat of frivolous lawsuits). 
174 . FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A); DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 135; Commission Recommendation, notes 150–51 and 
accompanying text (outlining the existing or proposed representation criteria in each 
jurisdiction). 
175.  DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
131; see supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text (noting the certification processes 
proffered by the UK government and the European Commission for representative 
claims and bodies). 
176.  DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 135  
(offering factors likely to be considered as part of the UK representative action 
certification process). 
177. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text (detailing the representative 
action certification criteria proposed by the European Commission). 
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Notably, the United Kingdom and European Union aim to 
implement these certification processes in order to avoid a 
litigious culture allegedly brought about by US-style class 
actions.178 Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
however, also requires class certification and the class must be 
able to demonstrate certain prerequisites, including: (a) 
numerosity, (b) commonality among claims, (c) adequacy of the 
representative parties, and (d) typicality. 179  The procedure 
developed to certify US class action suits contains the same 
substantive elements proposed under the UK and EU regimes.180 
Therefore, without having cases to review regarding the level of 
stringency with which the UK and EU certification requirements 
apply, the efficacy of their respective efforts to avoid American-
style class actions is questionable.   
C. Opt-in Inertia 
The opt-in model endorsed by the European Commission 
faces the inertia obstacle, which ultimately will cripple the 
proposed collective action regime for antitrust claimants.181 The 
fears associated with the opt-out approach weighed heavily 
against its adoption; the Commission explained that the opt-out 
system raised fundamental questions as to potential claimants’ 
autonomy to decide whether they wish to litigate.182 Whereas 
inactivity in an opt-out system results in a large class of 
uninvolved claimants, inactivity in an opt-in system results in an 
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178.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text; note 149–150 and accompanying 
text (identifying the proposed certification process as a key defense against the 
emergence of the alleged litigious culture associated with US-style class actions). 
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A); see supra note 81 and accompanying text (outlining the 
class certification requirements in the US justice system). 
180. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; note 135 and accompanying text; 
note 149–150 and accompanying text; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(A) (comparing the 
certification criteria under the existing US model and the proposed regimes in the 
United Kingdom and the European Union). 
181. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (discussing the European 
Commission’s commitment to the opt-in model for collective redress). 
182. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. But see SORABJI ET AL., supra note 
3, at 149 (arguing that, as part of the certification process, where potential claimants 
are given proper and effective notice to enable them to opt-out of the collective action, 
this notice provides each individual the opportunity to exercise their right of party 
autonomy). 
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active but small class of claimants.183 Plaintiffs’ attorneys project 
that “through inertia alone” very few potential claimants will 
choose to pursue a collective claim.184 By requiring claimants to 
opt-in, the European Commission drastically reduces the initial 
pool of claims.185 The EU Recommendation that heralds the opt-
in approach fails to overcome the inertia hurdle and does not 
advance—and indeed will subvert—the goal of enhancing 
private actions in this area of the law. 
In the United Kingdom, the low level of claimant 
participation in the opt-in system was “the single biggest hurdle” 
to the effectiveness of the existing collective action scheme.186 
Participation rates were a key factor in the decision to shift 
toward a limited opt-out system.187 The UK’s adoption of a 
limited opt-out model stands to provide compensation to a 
greater number of victims of competition infringements.188 In 
this capacity, the Consumer Rights Act 2014 fulfills the aims of 
increasing access to justice for claimants and strengthening the 
deterrence effect that collective litigation can have on future 
breaches of competition law.189 Furthermore, the opt-out model 
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183. Howells, supra note 2, at 9 (asserting that “the numbers are ‘crunched’ to 
demonstrate that opt-out regimes attract higher degrees of participation than opt-in 
regimes”). 
184. See Lipman, supra note 158 (quoting practitioner Daniel Small, at Cohen 
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, expressing “You’re just going to get, through inertia 
alone, very few potential class members opting in”). 
185. SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 101 (noting that opt-in regimes in the 
European Union and the United States typically produce considerably lower rates of 
participation as compared to opt-out regimes, while opt-in rates in the United 
Kingdom’s group litigation scheme vary from as little as less than one percent to almost 
all group members). 
186.  DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 2, 
at 31; SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 78 (affirming that the opt-in model creates 
significant barriers to entry in collective follow-on competition actions). 
187. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 CONSULTATION, supra note 
2, at 31 (noting that Civil Justice Council’s research demonstrates that the great 
majority of opt-in rates are 50% or lower, whereas the average participation rates in opt-
out cases in non-UK legal systems have ranged between 87% to 99%); see OPTIONS 
REFORM—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 9, at 30 (identifying the opt-in model as 
the primary point of concern regarding the existing regime’s inability to provide access 
to justice for victims of antitrust infringements). 
188. Howells, supra note 2, at 9; SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 100–01 (asserting 
that numerical data substantiates anecdotal evidence that opt out “catches more 
litigants in the fishing net”). 
189 . SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3, at 101; OPTIONS REFORM—GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE, supra note 10, at 30 (linking the opt-in model with poor access to justice in 
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enhances judicial efficiency for defendants; the totality of 
potential exposure related to a particular competition 
infringement can be better assessed, which may encourage 
defendants to settle claims earlier.190 The decision to employ a 
limited opt-out mechanism is crucial to the success of creating a 
robust collective action regime in private antitrust enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Issacharoff and Miller made an accurate 
prediction when they opined, “an apparent cultural revulsion at 
accepting the reality of legal enforcement as entrepreneurial 
activity may leave the reforms without the necessary agents of 
implementation.”191 The instant analysis assessed whether the 
UK government and the European Commission, in an attempt 
to avoid the US class action model, pursued legal frameworks 
that can accomplish the intended aims of creating limited and 
appropriate avenues for collective redress. The three 
determinative factors subject to review were the representative 
certification requirements, the sources of funding, and the 
selected collective action model for aggregating claims. 
The UK Consumer Rights Act and the European 
Commission’s Recommendations for collective redress express a 
need for pre-trial certification of collective actions. 192  The 
proposed certification requirements are meant to act as 
safeguards against the creation of a culture of litigation where 
claims are brought and settled without adequate scrutiny as to 

the antitrust realm and suggesting the opt-out model as a solution to the access to 
justice deficit). 
190. Response to the Department for Business Innovation & Skills’ Consultation on the 
Draft Consumer Rights Bill, BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 132 and 
accompanying text; see also DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS—2012 
CONSULTATION, supra note 2, at 33–34 (adding that the opt-out model improves 
efficiency by making a judgment binding on all those who do not opt-out, thereby 
increasing certainty for defendants that future parallel proceedings will not occur). 
191. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 5, at 181 (opining whether the constraints 
imposed on new collective action reforms in Europe will cause the reforms to be 
ineffective). 
192. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; note 149–150 and accompanying 
text (referencing the certification processes in the UK and EU proposals for collective 
redress mechanisms). 
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merit.193 The certification process is also a part of the American-
style class action model, and there are parallels among the 
factors reviewed in making the certification determination.194 
Recent trends in the US justice system show movement toward a 
more stringent review, or “rigorous analysis,” of the claimants’ 
ability to meet the class prerequisites, and a heightened level of 
skepticism toward the scope of private action’s role in antitrust 
cases more broadly.195 The implications of this shift indicate that 
the US and the EU/UK attitudes and approaches toward 
collective redress may be converging. 
One issue upon which the UK government and the 
European Commission saw eye-to-eye, but that clashes with US 
legal custom, was the funding of collective actions.196 Both saw fit 
to prohibit contingency fees and uphold the loser pays rule, 
which are long-held legal traditions in both jurisdictions.197 
While the underlying intent was to discourage entrepreneurial 
lawyers from pursuing frivolous or meritless claims, the effect of 
these policies will be to hobble efforts to enhance collective 
action in competition cases by dampening the ability and the 
will of plaintiffs to bring claims.198 
The most drastic, and perhaps most seminal, difference 
between the approaches adopted by the UK government and 
the European Commission lies in the decision to adopt 
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193. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; Commission Communication 
2013, supra note 156, at 6, 10–11 (identifying the certification process as an important 
safeguard against the US class action model pitfalls). 
194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; note 135 and accompanying text; 
note 149-150 and accompanying text (illustrating the similarities between the 
certification factors proposed by the UK government and the European Commission, 
and the Rule 23 requirements under the US class action model). 
195. See supra note 79 accompanying text (noting that in recent years the US 
Supreme Court has shown skepticism toward the scope of private actions generally in 
antitrust enforcement); Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); 
Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432, 1434 (2013) (holding that a rigorous 
analysis must take place at the class certification stage). 
196. See supra notes 139, 157 and accompanying text (expressing the employment 
of the loser-pays rule and the ban on contingency fees to distinguish the UK and EU 
collective redress proposals from the US class action alternative). 
197. See supra notes 139–141, 157–159 and accompanying text (describing the 
respective reliance on the loser-pays rule and ban on contingency fees in the UK and 
EU proposals). 
198 . See supra notes 170, 172–173 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
difficulty and risk in bringing collective actions in light of the funding constraints 
imposed by the contingency fee ban and the loser-pays rule). 
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contrasting models for aggregating claims. 199  While the UK 
Consumer Rights Act proposed a limited opt-out model for 
collective action claims, the European Commission 
recommended an opt-in approach.200 The opt-out model stands 
to greatly increase the level of private enforcement of 
competition law in the UK, which also positively impacts 
deterrence objectives and judicial economy.201 The European 
Commission’s opt-in recommendation, however, seriously 
undercuts the same broader objectives by dramatically reducing 
the pool of aggregated claims in representative actions.202 
While the UK’s approach retains some safeguards and 
limitations to the collective action scheme proposed, the 
government has taken important steps toward opening up 
avenues for more people to access justice. The European 
Commission has also taken steps through its Recommendation 
to encourage private enforcement of competition law through 
claims aggregation, but has constrained the mechanisms for 
collective redress to such an extent so as to make substantial 
changes to the status quo unlikely. 
  
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199. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (identifying the opt-in versus opt-
out issue as a key point of deviation between the EU and UK proposals). 
200. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting the divergent approaches 
taken by the European Commission, which recommends the opt-on collective redress 
model exclusively, and the United Kingdom, which has aligned with the US model in 
offering an opt-out alternative). 
201. SORABJI ET AL., see supra note 3 and accompanying text; OPTIONS REFORM—
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, see supra note 126 (referencing the low participation rates in 
opt-in model collective action regimes generally and the ineffectiveness of the existing 
opt-in system in the United Kingdom as impediments to maximum private antitrust 
enforcement). 
202. Howells, supra note 2, at 9; SORABJI ET AL., supra note 3 (supporting the 
contention that opt-in regimes typically produce substantially lower participation rates 
in collective actions). 
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